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LOGICAL LEVELS OF PROBLEM SOLVING 
LEON STERLING 
D This paper demonstrates how clear, efficient problem solving programs can 
be written within logic programming. The key point is the consideration of 
levels involved, both in the problem solving itself and in the underlying 
logic. Three levels of knowledge necessary for intelligent problem solving 
are identified-a level of domain knowledge, a level of methods and 
strategies, and a planning level. The approach introduced here relates these 
levels to the distinction between object and meta languages. Two classes of 
programs are presented. First, single level problem solvers are introduced. 
These are at the methods level and constitute a meta language of the 
problem domain. Second, flexible multilevel problem solvers are outlined 
which can be built as extensions of the single level programs. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many different pieces of knowledge needed to build powerful problem 
solvers. Knowledge about the domain, knowledge about the available problem 
solving methods and strategies, knowledge about forming plans from the methods. 
This paper claims that distinct levels should exist for the different types of knowl- 
edge, and shows how to incorporate this differentiation of levels into clear, efficient 
problem solving programs. 
Three levels are introduced-a domain level, a methods level, and a planning level. 
No formal definition will be given of these and boundaries between them are 
somewhat fuzzy. However the three levels have a hierarchic relationship, where the 
methods level sits between the planning level and the domain level. A similar 
decomposition into levels has been given by Stefik [19] in his program for planning 
experiments in molecular genetics. He describes three spaces, a strategy space, a 
design space, and a laboratory space, which correspond, respectively, to the planning 
level, methods level, and domain level introduced here. 
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In order to discuss problem solving one needs a language. Predicate logic is 
chosen here as the language for representing both the task of problem solving and 
the more abstract entities such as strategies and plans. The case for using logic as the 
representational language for problem solving has been presented strongly in other 
places, e.g., [ll, 141. Their principal point is that all reasoning performed should be 
explicitly represented and not hidden in fancy data or control structures. 
In this paper the further restriction to Horn clause logic is made. Logic program- 
ming has two aspects making it ideal for problem solving-a clear semantics as 
advocated in the previous paragraph, plus a practical language, Prolog, for imple- 
menting the problem solvers. All examples in this paper of problem solving pro- 
grams will be given as Prolog code. Background on the use of logic for problem 
solving can be found in [12], while for programming in Prolog the reader is referred 
to [6]. 
Choosing logic as the representational language gives rise to further levels-those 
arising from the notions of object and meta language. Trying to use the meta 
language in problem solving programs is not new. Using the power of metalevel 
reasoning has always been a seductive idea waiting to be exploited. Several re- 
searchers have discussed how meta concepts could be incorporated into intelligent 
programs. Weyhrauch [26] gives a formal treatment and describes a system where 
interaction between the levels, termed reflection, happens. Bowen and Kowalski [l] 
discuss reflection in the context of logic programming, considering systems which 
amalgamate object and meta languages. Bundy and co-workers have discussed 
“meta-level inference” for problem solving, describing programs solving symbolic 
equations [3], and mechanics problems stated in natural language [4] which are based 
on distinguishing between object and meta theories. Davis [7] and Stefik [19] discuss 
including meta concepts in expert systems. 
This paper takes a new approach, relating the object/meta level distinction to the 
levels of problem solving. A key idea is the association of the methods level with a 
meta language of the domain level. More traditionally, the meta language of the 
problem solving domain is associated with control, e.g., [7]. Even Bundy and 
Welham [3] who essentially axiomatize a methods level for equation solving present 
their work in terms of controlling search of an object level space. Clarifying the 
problem solving levels here puts the work described above in perspective. And, as 
will be demonstrated, the approach advocated here leads to powerful, practical 
problem solvers. 
A brief diversion is appropriate to relate this paper to the development of expert 
systems. The author regards expert systems as a special case of problem-solving 
programs. Hence lessons from research in expert systems are relevant for writing 
problem solving problems in a logic programming framework and vice versa. The 
innovation provided by research in expert systems was essentially due to the sort of 
problems tackled and the approach of achieving expert performance by making 
programs knowledge intensive. Expert systems have been successful in domains 
where the inference necessary is relatively superficial, but the domain knowledge is 
of key importance. Earlier research on problem solving, on the other hand, e.g., GPS 
[8], concentrated on identifying, developing, and using powerful, general-purpose 
inference mechanisms. These are artificial distinctions particularly as expert systems 
develop. It has been argued eloquently by Davis in [7] that expert systems will need 
to become more sophisticated in their reasoning. 
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The layout of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the object and 
meta levels in an informal manner. These are illustrated in the following section with 
a simple example, the plan-formation problem for the blocks world discussed by 
Kowalski in [12] and [13]. The following two sections discuss how problem solving 
programs should be written in logic programming as influenced by these notions of 
levels. Section 4 introduces single-level problem solvers. These are practical, efficient 
programs written at the methods level, rather than at the domain level, in contrast to 
most expert systems. A methodology for writing such single level programs is given 
in [21]. Section 5 shows how more flexible multilevel problem solving programs can 
be built in logic programming. Finally brief conclusions are given. 
2. OBJECT AND META LEVELS 
The aim of this section is to clarify the meaning of the terms “object” and “meta.” A 
language consists of a theory, i.e., a set of axioms, and a proof procedure. The 
object-level of the problem-solving domain is a typical language. A proof procedure 
consists of a strategy for enumerating the inferences that can be made within the 
theory, and a computation rule for resolving the nondeterministic hoices of the 
strategy. An interpreter is needed to execute the proof procedure. A pure logic 
program constitutes a language-the Horn clauses (given their declarative reading) 
being the theory and SLD resolution (augmented by a suitable computation rule) the 
proof procedure. Prolog interpreters execute this proof procedure using depth first 
search as the computation rule. 
Two languages, Ll and L2, are in an object-meta relationship if there is a (partial) 
axiomatization of the theory and proof procedure of language Ll in the language L2. 
In this case the terms object theory, object language, meta theory, and meta language 
have their obvious interpretation. Informally the meta language describes the 
relationships that hold in the object language. Examples will be given in the next 
section. 
Introducing a meta theory for an object language gives an additional way of 
solving an object level problem. Not only can the object level proof procedure be 
executed irectly, but it can be simulated via its representation in the meta language. 
More generally, a proof can contain inferences in both the object theory and meta 
theory. Crossing between the object and meta levels has been termed reflection and 
discussed formally in [26]. It is shown that solving problems by direct execution in 
the object language is equivalent to simulation in the meta language. There is a 
detailed discussion in [12] of object and meta languages, simulation and reflection, in 
the context of logic programming. 
The remainder of the paper discusses how to relate these logical entities to the 
problem solving levels. Briefly, the most powerful effect occurs when the methods 
level is regarded as a meta language for the domain level. It is also possible to regard 
the planning level as a meta language of the methods level, but that relationship 
remains to be explored. 
3. PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE BLOCKS WORLD 
This section considers an example to illustrate the various levels introduced so far. 
The example used is a variant of the plan-formation problem discussed in [12,13]. 
The problem is to form a plan in the blocks world, i.e., to specify a sequence of 
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FIGURE 1. Initial and final states of a blocks world problem. 
actions for restacking blocks to achieve a particular configuration. An approach 
concentrating on the planning level can be found in [25] where a general planning 
program is given in Prolog capable of solving blocks world problems. 
Figure 1 gives the initial state and desired final state of a blocks world problem. 
The actions allowed are moving a block from the top of a block to a place, and 
moving a block from one block to another. For the action to succeed the top of the 
moved block must be clear, and also the place or block to which it is being moved. 
Kowalski gives, in his own words, both a one-level and two-level formulation. The 
one-level formulation in [12] is essentially a domain level specification. In [13], 
however, he “employs a two-level representation using the object-level to describe 
the individual states of the database and using the metalevel to describe the 
relationship between one state of the database and a successor state.” 
Figure 2 gives a program for solving the plan formation problem. We discuss it in 
light of the definitions of the previous section, comparing it with Kowalski’s 
versions. No attempt has been made to improve the power of Kowalski’s formula- 
tion. The only changes that have been made are to clarify the manifestation of levels 
as will be discussed below. Edinburgh Prolog conventions are used throughout, see, 
e.g., 161. 
Key procedures are state_trans and update. The predicate state trans(S1, 
S2,AqPlan) is true if there is a plan of actions, Plan, transforming state Slmto state 
S2. Note that Sl and S2 name states. The third argument, AC, is an accumulator of 
the actions performed so far, necessary to avoid looping through previous states. A 
more powerful problem solver would keep a list of former states rather than former 
actions. This introduces the problem of determining when two states are identical 
and is beyond the scope of Kowalski’s program. The predicate 
update(State,Action,Ac,NewState) is true if State names a state, Action an action, 
AC the actions performed so far, and New State names the state obtained by 
applying Action to State. Attempting to satisfy the update goal simulates the 
performance of the action in the blocks world. 
The names chosen here to represent states are very descriptive-just a list of the 
facts which are true. For example the “name” of the initial state is [on(a,b), on(b,p), 
on(q), clear(a), clear(q), clear(c)]. Such names have an advantage that they allow 
easy testing whether facts are true in the states being named. For example to know 
whether a particular block, X say, is clear in state S, one tests whether the fact 
clear(X) is a member of the list of the name of state S. The predicates clear and on 
have been thus defined in Figure 2. 
, This is slightly different from Kowalski’s approach, who introduces a predicate 
demonstrate(X,Y) (demo for short)-which for the current problem is true if Y is true 
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plan form(Plan) :- 
initial_state(Sl), state_trans(Sl,S2,[],Plan), final_state(S2). 
state_trans(S,S,Actions,Actions). 
state_trans(Sl,S2,Ac,Actions) :- 
update(Sl,A,Ac,S), state_trans(S,S2,[A]Ac],Actions). 
update(Sl,A,Ac,S2) :- 
action(A,Sl), legal(A,Sl),not member(A,Ac), transform(ASlS2). 
action(to_block(X,Y,Z),S) :- on(X,Y ,S), block(Z). 
action(to_place(X,Y,Z),S) :- on(X,Y,S), place(Z). 
legal(to_block(X,Y,Z),S) :- clear(X,S), clear(Z,S), X\ = = Z. 
legal(to_place(X,Y,Z),S) :- clear(X,S), clear(Z,S), X\ = = Z. 
initial_state([on(a,b),on(b,p),on(c,r), clear(a),clear(q), clear(c)]). 
final-state(S) :- member(on(a,b),S),member(on(b,c),S), member(on(c,r),S). 
clear(X,State) :- member(clear(X),State). 
on(X,Y,State) :- member(on(X,Y),State). 
block(a). block(b). block(c). 
place(p). place(q). place(r). 
FIGURE 2. Program for the plan-formation problem. 
in state X, e.g., to test whether a state S is a final state would be written as 
final_state( S) :- demo( S,Gl) , demo( S,G2), 
where Gl and G2 name the terms you want to be true, namely on(a,b) and on(b,c). 
Kowalski also uses the demo predicate to make explicit the use of reflection. Using 
demo avoids the need of defining separate test predicates for each predicate such as 
clear and on, but is likely to yield inefficient programs if all operations must go via 
the demo predicate. Such considerations will become less important if work on 
automatic program transformation advances. 
In the program of Figure 2 changing the state of the world is done by the 
procedure transform(Action,Sl,S2). Sl is the list of facts used to name state Sl, 
while S2 is similarly the list of facts naming S2. There are different ways of writing 
it, but all essentially just remove the facts from the list Sl that are no longer true and 
add the lists that have become true to obtain the list S2. Kowalski similarly updates 
the global database via add and delete predicates. 
How do the different levels appear in this example? The manifestation of logical 
levels has already been indicated. The predicates update and state_trans are inher- 
ently part of a meta language of the blocks world rather than of an object language. 
Further, the problem of forming a plan has been solved by simulation in the meta 
language rather than direct execution in the object language. 
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The distinction between simulation and direct execution may not be obvious here 
due to the complete exiomatization of the object language proof procedure, moving 
blocks to change the world, in the meta language. The program in Figure 2 
axiomatizes the movement of the blocks with the predicate update which calls the 
predicate action to find all the possible actions. Here they are just the simple domain 
level operators. In general only a partial axiomatization might be given. The 
examples of the next section have an incomplete axiomatization of the object 
language proof procedure in the meta language. This leads to efficient programs for 
solving equations and proving theorems. 
Where do the problem solving levels fit in? This is not a rich example in terms of 
knowledge needed to solve the problem. The methods level consists of only two 
simple methods, moving a block to a block and moving a block to a place, which are 
a direct translation of object level operators. (Kowalski only has one method, the 
extra one here is only for illustrative purposes.) A methods level more generally 
would consist of more interesting strategies not necessarily directly obtained from 
object level operators. For the blocks world such methods are reversing the order of 
a stack of two blocks, or building a tower. These methods would be axiomatized in 
the same way as to-block and to-place. 
Structure or knowledge related to planning is also minimal in the program. 
Further it is present implicitly rather than explicitly. Examples of such planning 
knowledge are structure of methods and preferred order of methods. The methods 
can be specified, e.g., in terms of add and delete lists, namely the list of facts made 
true by the method, and the list of facts no longer true. Here they are built into the 
transform predicate. The to block action is preferred to the to-place action indi- 
cated by its appearing first-in the list of actions. So the planning level doesn’t 
explicitly exist here. It is shown in Section 5 how such implicit levels can be made 
explicit. 
4. SINGLE LEVEL PROBLEM SOLVERS 
In this section we consider how these notions of levels get translated into problem 
solvers. The naive view, adopted by the early expert systems, was to have only one 
level, a domain level full of knowledge, and a simple proof procedure to find 
consequences of that knowledge. Concepts of object and meta language were not 
considered, and the problem solving domains were such that methods and plans 
were not particularly necessary. Davis [7] claims that such an approach is fundamen- 
tally limited. 
A more promising approach, still only using one level, is to think in terms of 
methods rather than domain knowledge. The program of the previous section was a 
toy example of such a program. When a reasonably comprehensive set of methods 
can be found for a problem solving domain, a powerful single level problem solver 
can be built. In terms of the three problem-solving levels introduced in this paper, 
only the middle one, the level of methods and strategies, is actually present. 
However, by incorporating the concept of object and meta languages one can 
understand where the other levels fit in. Axiomatizing a meta theory rather than an 
object theory to aid in problem solving has been described in [3]. 
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What happens to the other levels in such single level problem solvers? The 
domain level becomes axiomatized in the methods level, i.e., the methods level 
constitutes a meta language of the problem solving domain. All problem solving then 
occurs via simulation in this meta language. The power of the problem solver then 
depends on this axiomatization. In general, there is a tradeoff between efficiency 
gained from only partially axiomatizing the domain level and completeness of the 
final problem solver. In principle one can simulate the complete object level proof 
procedure in the meta language but this leads to inefficient programs. Axiomatizing 
complex strategies in terms of simple domain actions leads to efficient programs. 
The planning level is treated differently. It becomes “programmed” into the 
methods level using knowledge of the behavior of the interpreter for the methods 
level. For writing problem solvers in Prolog, this means using the order of clauses in 
a procedure, and the order of literals in the body of a clause to convey the planning 
information. For sufficiently simple domains, this planning information can be 
expressed cleanly. In [21] a methodology is described for building these single-level 
problem solvers. 
In order to gauge the appropriateness of this approach, let us consider some 
examples. A powerful single-level problem solver has been built for solving symbolic 
equations. The program, PRESS, has been written in Prolog and described in [3,22]. 
PRESS regards the domain level as manipulating algebraic formulae according to 
rules of algebra. Methods are applications of rewrite rules to produce a particular 
effect, e.g., isolating the occurrence of a variable on the left-hand side of an equation. 
Plans are sequences of methods. Arguments establishing the advantages of using a 
meta language for the particular case of equation solving have been made in other 
places. The benefit of using simulation at the meta level to solve symbolic equations 
has been argued in [3], while how the equations are then solved by simulation is 
explained in [2]. The equation solving abilities themselves are described in [22]. It 
should be noted, however, that hindsight allows a new perspective on what has been 
done, and so the description of the approach to equation solving suggested by 
PRESS is expressed ifferently here. 
Another example is the task of theorem proving. Traditionally theorem provers, 
especially those based on resolution, were domain based. Inference rules and axioms 
for a theory are given and theorems are proved by applying the inference rules to the 
axioms. It is hard to express strategies in such theorem provers and the few 
impressive theorems they have proved have been accomplished by brute force,-see, 
e.g., [15]. 
The approach suggested here is to add a methods level and axiomatize the 
theorem proving steps within this methods level. What are the methods in theorem 
proving? An example is induction. Figure 3 gives a sample of program code for 
implementing this method. It illustrates the power of single-level programs, but also 
expresses the planning information. More details about the full program, and the 
particular induction proof plan it implements, can be found in [23,20]. 
How are the levels manifest in this code? The planning level is incorporated in 
two ways. Firstly by the order of literals in the bodies of clauses. Clause (i) in Figure 
3 tells how to prove .a theorem by induction, namely you must find a suitable 
induction scheme, prove the base case, and prove the step case. Before proving the 
base and step cases, it is necessary to find the appropriate induction scheme. This 
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prove_by_induction(Theorem) :- 
structural_induction(Theorem,Scheme), 
prove_base_case(Theorem,Scheme), 
prove_step_case(Theorem,Scheme). 
0) 
prove_step_case(Theorem,Scheme) :- 
step_version(Theorem,Scheme,StepVersion,ProgramHypothesis), 
negate and_skolemize (StepVersion,Goal,Assertions), 
induction_hypothesis(Theorem,Scheme,IndHypothesis), 
prove(Goal,scheme,Assertions, ProgramHypothesisJndHypothesis). 
(ii) 
prove(Goal,scheme,Assertions, ProgramHypothesisJndHypothesis) :- 
unfold_hypothesis(ProgramHypothesis,Performant,Recursant), 
fold_goal(Goal,GoalPerformant, GoalRecursant), 
apply ind_hyp(GoalRecursant,IndHypothesis, Goall) 
establish_hypothesis(Goall,Scheme,Recursant,Goa12), 
add_goal(Goal2,GoalPerformant,Goal3), 
establish_step(Goal3,Assertions,Scheme,Performant,Recursant). 
(iii) 
FIGURE 3. A fragment of a program to prove theorems by induction. 
information is built into the order of the literals in the body of clause (i). Second, 
clauses are ordered in their preferred order of use. This is not illustrated in the code 
above, but will be discussed in the next section in the context of the relationship 
between single and multilevel programs. 
The actual theorem proving steps or domain level transformations are axioma- 
tized in tactics which express the relationship between various logical formulae. An 
example of a tactic is “fold,” introduced by Burstall and Darlington for programs 
expressed as first-order recursion equations [5]. Bundy adapted it for simply recur- 
sive logic programs-the adaptation is described in [23]. Particular instances have 
the form fold(Clause,Recurse,New), where New is the result of folding Clause with 
respect to its recursive definition, named by Recurse. Attempting to satisfy a fold 
goal will result in the fold transformation taking place by simulation. How that is 
implemented is irrelevant o the problem solver, all that is needed to know is that a 
fold step has been done. As an example, the predicate, fold-goal, appearing in clause 
(iii) in Figure 3 invokes the fold tactic. 
The structure of the code of Figure 3 is a result of polishing the methods of 
theorem proving. There has been an organization step where the plan has been 
clarified and refined to such an extent that it is readily expressible in a one-level 
program. It should be noted that such polishing proceeds naturally by top-down 
program development. The top-down nature of the development is due to thinking 
at the methods level rather than the domain level. 
Sometimes a single level problem solver suffices for the problem solving task. This 
occurs if a powerful set of methods can be found for the domain. In this case, there 
seems to be little point in adding extra levels of complexity, such as planning, if they 
are not needed in solving the problem. For example, it is shown how to add the 
framework for a planning level for equation solving in the next section. If it doesn’t 
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improve the equation solving ability of the program there is no need to incorporate 
it. 
What conclusion can the builder of an expert system draw from this? How can he 
determine a priori whether his domain will be.sufficiently simple that a one-level 
program will suffice? There is no obvious answer, but nothing is lost by writing as if 
the domain were simple. My experience leads to the conjecture that the clarifications 
of difficulties in the problem solving domain that will be raised by trying to write a 
one-level program will be directly useful when writing a multilevel program. Writing 
programs in this way is very much in the style of structural development [17]. 
5. MULTILEVEL PROBLEM SOLVING 
Single-level problem solvers are inadequate in general. The uniform proof procedure 
needed to execute them is usually too inflexible. This inflexibility was commented on 
in the early days of automatic theorem proving by many, e.g., Hayes [lo]. He 
believed in controlling logic with logic, a view agreed with here. The problem is how 
to implement it. 
One approach is to add an extra control level. The earliest proponent for this 
approach in expert systems is Davis [7]. He argues for introducing “metarules” as a 
way of adding control. In terms of the levels discussed here, it means adding a meta 
language to the domain level within which one expresses control of the domain ievel 
proof procedure. Figure 4 gives a metarule used by Davis in [7] and suggests its 
translation in logic programming. The translation is not exact due to the different 
contexts. For example, considering rules with uncertainties, important in the expert 
systems studied by Davis, is not part of the general problem solving style in logic 
programming. 
This approach of equating the meta level with a general control level has been 
adopted into logic programming by Gallaire and Lasserre [9]. They have defined a 
set of control primitives and propose adding metarules to programs to improve 
performance in the way advocated by Davis. Writing an appropriate interpreter is 
another way of adding a control level. In [16] a methodology is given for writing 
interpreters in logic for controlling logic programs. 
FIGURE 4. A meta rule of Davis expressed in logic. 
If 
1. the age of the client is greater than 60, 
2. there are rules which mention high risk, 
3. there are rules which mention low risk, 
then it is likely (.8) that the former should be used after the latter. 
prefer(Rulel,Rule2,Context) :-
low_risk(Rulel), 
high_risk(Rule2), 
client _ age(Age,Context), Age > 60. 
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Using the meta language as a control language, however, means piecing together a 
program from general-purpose tools and techniques rather than building an in- 
tegrated, domain specific program. The message of the expert system experience is 
that using domain knowledge is important. It seems reasonable that specific knowl- 
edge will be vital for writing the planning and methods levels as well as the domain 
level. Information such as the order in which to apply methods should be incorpo- 
rated into the problem solving predicates themselves rather than in general purpose 
primitives. When developing programs the author finds it more natural to think in 
terms of domain concepts rather than somewhat artificial control primitives. 
A better alternative to adding a control level is embedding the single-level 
problem solver in a multilevel version. The different forms of knowledge (about 
plans, methods, and the domain) can be reasoned about in distinct ways. In 
principle each knowledge level added requires its own interpreter. The problem is 
incorporating the different interpreters efficiently. We now discuss how this can be 
achieved, principally considering how the equation solving program, PRESS, men- 
tioned in the previous section, could form the basis of a multilevel program. 
Let us consider the addition of a planning level to the equation solving program. 
The top-level goal of PRESS is a procedure solve(Equation,X,Solution). This proce- 
dure is essentially the interpreter for the equation solving methods, and is executed 
by the Prolog interpreter. To begin at the planning level we similarly need a top level 
procedure for the planning level which can again be executed by Prolog. Some 
simple code for the task is given in Figure 5. 
The predicate plan-solve builds in the possibility for sophisticated planning. The 
first predicate, applicable-plans, would find the suitable plans for the equation. 
These might be taken from a library of available plans, or generated on the basis of 
the features of the particular equation. Specific planning information about equa- 
tions would be used when appropriate. The next predicate, choose_plans, would 
filter the plans arising from the previous stage, and select one. Various heuristics 
could be encoded as to selection of plans. The predicate, salve/4, is then the 
interface to the methods level where the equation is solved. It replaces the predicate 
solve/3 as interpreter of the methods level. 
How a plan would be represented and how it would be used by a methods level 
would vary from domain to domain. For equation solving a simple representation of 
plans is sufficient to achieve the performance of PRESS. A toy planning level was 
added to PRESS where plans were represented by the structure plan(Name, PreCon- 
ditions, MethodSteps). The preconditions were used in the choice of an appropriate 
plan. The predicate solve was written as 
solve (Equation,X,Solution,Plan) :- 
plan( Plan,_,MethodSteps) ,call(MethodSteps). 
FIGURE 5. Interpreter for a planning level for equation solving. 
plan_solve(Equation,X,Solution) :- 
applicable_plans(Equation,X,Plans), 
choose_plan(Equation,Plans,Plan), 
solve(Equation,X,Solution,Plan). 
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In fact the appropriate method steps were taken directly from the solution procedure 
of PRESS. This primitive planning level did not improve the equation solving 
behavior of PRESS-to the contrary, it slowed the program. 
The knowledge oriented multilevel approach advocated here is not universally 
accepted. In their paper [9] on meta level control, Gallaire and Lasserre give a brief 
survey of different approaches. Our view is closest to what they call knowledge 
structuring. They disregard it after saying the following. “Instead of talking in terms 
of interpreter behaviour, they talk in terms of levels of perception of the world (e.g., 
objects, assemblies, equations, heuristics,. . . ). As no general agreement has yet been 
reached on a world structuring language, they are led to build their own language 
and interpreter.” 
What they imply is a flaw can be claimed as a feature. The difTiculty in building 
problem solvers is representing the relevant knowledge. In logic programming that 
means axiomatizing the problem domain. Coming up with an appropriate axiomati- 
zation is essentially building a language. Solving problems from different domains 
usually requires different views of the world, and hence different languages. It is also 
true that in principle each domain needs its own interpreter. But building an 
interpreter in Prolog is not an expensive overhead. Both the interpreters, for the 
planning and methods level described above, are Prolog programs where the 
difficulty is in understanding the domain, not in specifying the control. 
Consider another example taken from [18] where a program, LP, is described 
capable of learning to solve equations from worked solutions. Given a worked 
example, LP builds a schema for solving the equation, which consists of a list of 
methods to apply. To solve a new equation the predicate schema_solve is called, a 
simplified version of which appears in Figure 6. 
The predicate schema_solve is at the planning level of equation solving. It decides 
to try to apply a schema first, and if that is unsuccessful calls the usual solve 
procedure. In order to apply a schema, one must apply the methods contained in the 
schema. How to apply methods, the predicate apply method, is again at the 
planning level, where the relevant information can be appropriately expressed. Thus 
LP can be regarded as a multilevel extension of PRESS. 
A similar evolution is possible from the theorem proving program described in 
Figure 3. A program is being developed [24] which expresses the fine detail of an 
induction proof plan. The initial program had insufficient expressive power to 
control the theorem proving process, and thus the single-level program is being 
expanded into a multilevel one. 
FIGURE 6. Applying a learned schema to a new equation. 
schema_solve(Equation,[MethodIMethods],X,Solution) :- 
apply_method(Method,Equation,X,Equationl), 
schema_solve(Equationl,Methods,X,Solution). 
schema_solve(Equation,S,X,Solution) :- 
solve(Equation,X,Solution). 
162 L. STERLING 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have discussed various notions of levels of problem solving-arising both from 
the problem solving task itself and the logic used to implement it. Powerful 
single-level problem solvers are presented where the relationship to the other levels is 
made clear. Such programs are at the methods level, and constitute a meta theory for 
the domain. Intelligent, flexible problem solving requires inferences to be made at 
several evels. It is shown how the single-level problem solvers can be embedded in 
multilevel problem solvers, where implicit knowledge is made explicit. 
I would like to thank Ehud Shapiro for most helpful suggestions onearlier versions of this paper. The 
referees were also responsible for improvements. The author is currently supported by a Dov Biegun 
Postdoctoral Fellowship. 
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